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Jim Phillips, ‘Contested Memories: the Scottish Parliament and the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike’ 
Scottish Affairs, 24.2 (2015), 187-206 
Abstract 
The miners’ strike of 1984-5 is a site of contested memories. A debate in the Scottish 
Parliament on the 30th anniversary in March 2014 highlighted three particular points of 
contention: the economics of coal and the social costs of closures; the strategies of the 
NUM and the UK Conservative government; and the question of restorative justice for 
victimised strikers. This paper examines these controversies, measuring the perspectives of 
MSPs against the weight of historical evidence. It explores the moral economy of the 
Scottish coalfields, where closures in the 1960s and 1970s were agreed by the workforce 
because meaningful employment alternatives existed. Closures in the 1980s violated this 
moral economy. The paper demonstrates that the financial costs of producing coal were 
exaggerated in 1984, while the predicted negative social consequences of not producing 
coal were accurate. It argues that criticisms of NUM strategy in 1984-5 are outweighed by 
evidence that the Conservative government was attacking the moral economy, seeking to 
eliminate union voice from decisions about closures. It comments on the victimisation of 
strikers in 1984-5, arguing that contemporary calls for restorative justice are resisted by the 
Scottish government partly because the SNP – reflecting the broader mood in the Scottish 
Parliament – ignores the political salience of social class. 
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On 20 March 2014 the Scottish Parliament held a members’ business debate to mark the 
30th anniversary of the 1984-5 miners’ strike. Initiated by Iain Gray, Labour MSP for East 
Lothian, the debate highlighted competing party political memories of the strike and 
contrasting interpretations of its legacy (Scottish Parliament, 2014). This article analyses 
these contested memories. Two concepts from oral history theory are utilised. First, 
individuals construct or ‘compose’ memories of personal and public events that are 
consistent with their internal and often politicised narratives about history (Summerfield, 
2000). Second, such personal memory, especially where it is politicised, frequently interacts 
with a larger social narrative. This is sometimes called the ‘cultural circuit’. In speaking 
about the past individuals are influenced by the social narrative. Wittingly or unconsciously 
individuals then strengthen this social narrative as they articulate their ‘own’ memories. As 
a result other individuals are more likely to shape their recollections with reference to the 
larger – or hegemonic – social narrative (Thomson, 1998). Social memories are rarely non-
contentious, particularly where they relate to historical divisions. ‘Memory’, wrote 
Alessandro Portelli, when analysing the history of social and political antagonism in the 
coalfields of Kentucky, ‘is the ultimate site of conflict’ (2011: 192). 
These theoretical perspectives enrich understanding of the Scottish Parliament’s 30th 
anniversary debate, and memories of the strike more generally in Scotland. MSPs offered 
politicised characterisations of key events and personalities in the strike that were obviously 
structured by existing and antonymous social narratives. Three areas of contention stood 
out: coal closures and their impact on coalfield communities; the competing strategies of 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the UK Conservative government; and the 
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victimisation of strikers, who were sacked during the strike by their employer, the National 
Coal Board (NCB), in pursuance of government aims, and possibly in concert with the 
judiciary and the police. This article examines these contested issues, integrating the MSPs’ 
arguments with perspectives and evidence drawn from historical literature and NUM, NCB 
and government archives, including the minutes of the UK Cabinet Ministerial Group on 
Coal, released under the 30-year rule on 1 January 2014 (CMGC). 
In introducing the 30th anniversary debate Ian Gray emphasised that the strike was 
highly unusual. It was not about wages or changes in working conditions, but the jobs, pits 
and communities that were threatened by NCB and government plans for a smaller coal 
sector (29233-5). In Scotland it was also in defence of the broader ‘moral economy’ of the 
coalfields. E. P. Thompson used the concept of the moral economy to analyse popular 
protest in England. It remains a compelling framework of analysis. Thompson’s moral 
economy consisted of popular expectations and customs evolving from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries that were protected by the ‘crowd’ of plebeian workers and 
consumers against the profit-seeking behaviour of employers and traders (1971: passim). 
The moral economy of the Scottish coalfields had a shorter genesis. It was rooted in the 
struggles of the inter-war years, bolstered by the redistribution of wealth and esteem from 
middle to working class that applied generally in post-1945 Britain (McKibbin, 1999: 161), 
and consolidated by coal industry nationalisation in 1947. The moral economy was dynamic, 
but had two long-term features: strategic decisions, including those relating to pit closures, 
were taken jointly by management and union representatives; and closures were only 
ratified where the economic security of miners and their communities was preserved. In the 
1960s employment in Scotland’s pits more than halved, but economic activity in the 
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coalfields was stable. Miners of working age who wished to remain in the industry could 
usually do so, moving voluntarily to pits nearby. Substantial numbers of new jobs were also 
created, chiefly through UK government regional policy incentives that persuaded 
manufacturers – many in electrical engineering and other consumer goods industries – to 
move operations to the mining areas of Fife, Lanarkshire and the Lothians. This brought new 
employment opportunities for coalfield women as well as men. Political and managerial 
changes in 1979-80, specifically the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government in the UK and in Scotland the appointment of Albert Wheeler as NCB Area 
Chairman, placed this moral economy under severe pressure, and it was dismantled 
altogether after the strike (Phillips, 2013). 
 
Coal Closures, Class and ‘Communities’ 
The only Conservative MSP in the chamber for the Parliament’s debate on 20 March, which 
immediately followed First Minister’s Questions, was Murdo Fraser, of Mid Scotland and 
Fife. Fraser defended the UK Conservative government’s approach to the coal industry in 
the 1980s. Pit closures and redundancies were regrettable but necessary, given the 
unsustainably high losses of producing coal in Scotland, ‘nearly £14 on every tonne’ (29277). 
 Fraser’s narrative was structured by the larger Thatcherite view of British and 
Scottish industry in the 1970s and 1980s, with coal as a particularly poor performer, 
imprisoned by the alleged inefficiencies of public ownership and trade union ‘control’ 
(Dorey, 2013). The Thatcher governments were keen to accelerate the trend in UK energy 
policy since the 1950s, promoting greater use of gas, oil and nuclear power and further 
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reducing coal’s share of electricity-generation. The 1980 Coal Industry Act proposed ending 
public subsidy to the NCB by 1984, with the clear threat that all ‘unprofitable’ collieries 
would close. This was a highly contentious initiative in the early 1980s, amid recession and 
deindustrialisation, with limited employment alternatives for redundant miners and 
contracting business demand for electricity as big energy-users like steel and car 
manufacturing shrunk in scale (Ashworth, 1986: 418-19). It was also highly politicised and 
partial: the government rejected ‘subsidy’ to coal while offering increased state ‘investment’ 
in nuclear energy (Fothergill, 1988), and loosening the tax regime for multinationals 
operating in the North Sea (Woolfson et al, 1998: 36). The miners threatened a national 
strike in 1981 and the government temporarily retreated from the ambition of a subsidy-
free coal industry within three or four years. Ministers nevertheless encouraged the NCB to 
build up coal reserves and pressed the publicly-owned power generators to lower domestic 
consumer and business charges through increased oil burn and coal imports. The 
government then pursued cost control through another route, appointing the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MMC) to examine NCB finances. 
Fraser’s £14 per tonne average may be derived from the MMC’s 1983 report. Based 
on NCB data, this concluded that all coal was produced at an official loss in Scotland. The 
NCB’s financial calculations, however, were highly problematic, incorporating expenditure 
on activities that had no direct bearing on production. These included high interest 
payments to the government on capital loans, which at 6.3 per cent per annum were twice 
the average rate for nationalised industry, along with compensation for subsidence, 
pensions to retired employees and payments to redundant miners (Glyn, 1988). Critics of 
the MMC findings also reported that performance itself was highly subjective, and varied 
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according to investment. There was a close correlation between pits with high levels of 
investment and those with ‘good’ production records (Cutler et al, 1998). 
So the ‘loser’ narrative was highly dubious. Fraser’s reference to an overall Scottish 
average loss of £14 per tonne adds further confusion to the picture, overlooking substantial 
pit-level differences in performance. About 7 million tonnes were produced in Scotland in 
1982. Some 28 per cent of this output came from the Longannet complex of pits in West 
Fife and Kincardine, feeding the giant South of Scotland Electricity Board power station, 
where losses were rated by the MMC at just £1.50 per tonne. At the three other largest 
producers, Bilston Glen and Monktonhall in Midlothian, and Seafield in East Fife, in each 
case representing about 12-13 per cent of overall production in Scotland, losses per tonne 
ranged from £4.60 to £8.70 (MMC: Appendix 3.5 (a)). Hence 28 per cent of Scottish coal in 
the early 1980s was being produced at pits where the official losses were marginal and 
another 37 per cent at pits where losses were considerably lower than Fraser’s £14 a tonne, 
and remembering that these losses were in any case probably exaggerated. 
From this it can be concluded that the economic case for closures in Scotland, as 
elsewhere in Britain, was not clear cut. It was further challenged in 1983-4 by those who 
emphasised the social costs of ‘non-production’, with redundancy payments followed by 
unemployment maintenance, coupled with lost multiplier effects in coalfield areas (Glyn). 
Gloomy predictions of entrenched unemployment and poverty in the Scottish coalfields 
were borne out by the material consequences of closures, which swiftly followed the defeat 
of the strike. Eleven of the remaining fourteen pits were closed on economic grounds 
between 1986 and 1990, and deep mining in Scotland ended twelve years later. Roseanna 
Cunningham, the SNP government’s Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs 
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(29235), referred in the debate to the strike’s ‘toxic legacy of unemployment’. In the 2000s 
and early 2010s joblessness in all ex-coalfield communities remained above the Scottish and 
UK averages, accompanied by engrained social deprivation (Perchard, 2013). A crude but 
telling indicator of this was provided in the Scottish Parliament by Alex Rowley, Labour MSP 
for Cowdenbeath, who observed that 50 per cent of children in primaries 1-3 in the ex-
mining village of Ballingry were eligible for free school meals in 2014 (29227). 
 Fraser objected to the criticism that primary responsibility for these closures and 
their legacy should be borne by the Thatcher governments. He said that 172 mines 
disappeared in the UK under the Labour governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan 
in the 1960s and 1970s, exceeding the 154 that closed in the 1980s. This is ostensibly true, 
but it should be remembered that closures before 1979 were secured within the moral 
economy framework: they were agreed jointly by representatives of management and the 
workforce, and permitted only because alternative employment existed to guarantee the 
economic security of coalfield communities. The example of Fife, Scotland’s largest coalfield 
terrain after the Second World War, shows how this moral economy operated. From 1951 
to 1971 the number of Fife men employed in coal fell from 24,111 to 8,040, but there was 
no contraction in the overall number of economically active persons: just over 130,000 in 
each year. There was a particular increase in the female share of industrial employment, 
chiefly in electrical engineering, as US firms were established – via UK regional policy 
incentives – in the New Town of Glenrothes. Relatively few closures followed in the 1970s, 
either in Fife or Scotland generally, and this was partly because the rate of alternative job 
creation decelerated (Phillips, 2013: 104–5). 
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The closures of the 1980s, initiated by Albert Wheeler, NCB Scottish Area Director, to 
lower production costs, were fundamentally different. Starting at Kinneil in West Lothian in 
1982, and continuing in 1983 with Cardowan in Lanarkshire, plus Sorn and Highhouse in 
Ayrshire, these transgressed the moral economy. They were pushed through against union 
and workforce opposition (Phillips, 2012: 54-64), and in the inhospitable broader economic 
environment of deindustrialisation, recession, and escalating unemployment (Peden, 2012: 
654-62). Wheeler’s strategy included evading or abandoning existing joint industrial 
agreements at other pits: miners were sent home from shifts without pay; their 
representatives were harassed and bullied. This provoked a sequence of local strikes and 
lock-outs in 1983 and the early months of 1984. So widespread were the effects of this 
strategy that about 50 per cent of Scotland’s miners were already in dispute with local 
management when the national strike began in March 1984 (Brotherstone and Pirani, 2005: 
passim). 
 The significance of these tensions within the Scottish area of the NCB was ignored in 
the Parliamentary debate. There was emphasis instead on the strike as an external 
imposition on people, workplaces and communities in Scotland by the Conservative 
government and the national leadership of the NUM, approximately represented by the 
divergent personalities and politics of Margaret Thatcher and Arthur Scargill, elected union 
President in 1982. Adam Ingram, SNP MSP for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley, praised 
the courage of Ayrshire miners and the solidarity of the ‘working people of Scotland’, which 
he contrasted with ‘the single-mindedness of the most brutal and pitiless British leader 
since Cromwell’ and ‘the cowardice and hypocrisy’ of the Labour Party (29225-6). Fraser, 
having disputed the charges against Thatcher, blamed the eventual closures and job losses 
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on Scargill, ‘a demagogue’ who ‘misled’ the miners in pursuit of his core ‘ideological 
objective’, namely ‘bringing down the elected Government of the day’ (29228). 
 Ingram’s reference to ‘working people’ was an example of how participants in the 
debate avoided discussion of social class divisions, whether in Scotland or the UK more 
broadly. Paterson et al have noted that an increasing proportion of Scots identified 
themselves as working class in the closing decades of the 20th century, when in occupational 
structure terms the relative size of the manual working class was actually decreasing (2004: 
80-104). This can be related to recent Scottish economic and political history, including the 
‘civic Scotland’ narrative of the 1980s and 1990s, with Thatcherism as an external attack on 
various elements of Scottish economic and social life, including communal solidarity, the 
public sector and industrial employment (Gibbs, 2014). In an example of the ‘cultural circuit’ 
in operation, these elements – each associated with working class life and identity – then 
assumed a greater centrality in discussions about how Scottish national identity was distinct 
in the 21st century. At the same time, however, class as an economic, social and political 
identifier is rarely explicit in this mainstream public discourse. It hardly appears at all, for 
instance, in the Scottish Government’s 2013 White Paper, Scotland’s Future, even in 
passages on inequalities in employment, social protection, and housing and communities 
(Scottish Government, 2013: 103-9, 150-169). 
The complex inter-play of class and nation was evident too in the 2014 
Independence Referendum campaign. Both sides tried to mobilise working class voters, but 
appealed to them in highly coded terms. The Yes campaign spoke about its attachment to 
‘fairness’ and ‘justice’, and key figures, notably Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister in the 
Scottish government, referred to their own working class origins or background. The Better 
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Together campaign, especially in the climactic fortnight preceding the vote on 18 
September, pressed themes of ‘solidarity’ and ‘unity’ with the rest of the United Kingdom. 
Labour leaders, long given to talking about ‘hard working families’ or ‘hard working people’ 
rather than the ‘working class’, were prominent in this campaigning. The Better Together 
television broadcast on 8 September 2014, featuring Gordon Brown, the former Labour 
Prime Minister, included archive images of male and female manual workers engaged in 
industrial activity and – another coded working class reference – in hospital settings, 
reinforcing the ostensible message that the Union was vital to stable employment and a 
National Health Service operating in the public good. On the same evening as this broadcast, 
8 September, Gordon Brown set out a timetable for strengthening the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament in the event of a No vote on 18 September. He did so at Loanhead 
Miners’ Welfare and Social Club in Midlothian (Carrell and Wintour, 2014), a mile or so from 
the former site of Bilston Glen Colliery. This was a highly ambiguous situation in class terms. 
The miners’ club, a traditional centre in the coalfields of working class educational, cultural 
and recreational life, was providing a platform for advocacy of the Union, the political 
governors of which in the 1980s had used public policy to dismantle the material and 
industrial basis of the organised working class (Jones, 2012: 35-7, 48-9, 54-5, 188-9). 
 In similarly ambiguous ways SNP and some Labour MSPs used various codes in the 
30th anniversary debate to evade reference to the class dimensions of the strike. SNP 
members in particular spoke of the strike as an attack by the Conservative government on 
‘communities’ (29233, 29235), or, in the words of Jamie Hepburn, MSP for Cumbernauld 
and Kilsyth, ‘on the values of those around me and those that I hold now’ (29229). Labour 
members also emphasised the strike’s connections with ‘communities’, rather than the 
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working class (29226-7, 29234). ‘Community’ is, of course, a conventional and generally 
useful term for capturing localised and bounded interests and loyalties. But its meaning can 
be elusive, masking differences within localities, whether of class, gender or ethnicity 
(Gilbert: 10-16). Labour MSPs offered ‘composed’ narratives on this matter, emphasising the 
solidarity of mining communities in 1984-5 without reference to their divisions, including 
those arising from the incidence of strike-breaking which developed at a small number of 
pits, notably Bilston Glen. Labour MSPs were also generally reluctant to speak explicitly 
about class. Only Neil Findlay, Labour MSP for Lothian, used the specific qualifier of social 
class in relation to the strike, albeit indirectly, when describing the NUM leadership in 1984 
as the ‘political inspiration’ for his then teenage self:  
 
They were clever and articulate working-class men leading the fight for jobs, working 
in partnership with principled, organised, intelligent and determined women, who 
provided the campaign’s backbone, drive and energy (29231-2). 
 
So the strike involved working class people, organised in predominantly working class 
communities, and politicised by coalfield moral economy arguments and assumptions. 
These people and communities were struggling to preserve trade union voice in the 
workplace and economic security in the coalfields, defending the pits and the jobs that were 
jeopardised by government and NCB plans for the industry’s shrinkage. The vital role of 
women, as joint leaders and not ‘just’ loyal supporters of the strike, was commended by 
Gray as well as Findlay (29224), and is worth brief elaboration. Those who breached the 
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picket lines were stigmatised locally in gendered terms as inferior types of men: ‘weak’ 
individuals, degenerate alcoholics, inveterate gamblers and generally poor workers, saved in 
many instances from dismissal before the strike by their union representatives. Women 
played a key role in vilifying strike-breakers and strike-breaking, elevating its social costs. 
(Stead, 1987: 68-75). More tangibly women reduced the economic costs of striking, with 
their earnings from employment, and energetic and skilful management of community-
based strike centres. They shared the political campaigning with men, in Scotland as 
elsewhere, and sustained the strike morally and materially for just over a year (Spence and 
Stephenson, 2009). 
 
Competing NUM and UK government strategies 
The NUM’s strategy in 1984-5 has recently been criticised in Scottish Affairs by Bob Eadie 
(2014), on three grounds: there was no national ballot in advance of the strike, which 
weakened its legitimacy; picketing of the Ravenscraig steel mill in Lanarkshire and other 
important economic units was counter-productive, jeopardising the employment of other 
workers and hence narrowing the basis of wider labour movement and social support for 
the miners; and a settlement with the NCB, preserving pits and jobs, could have been 
achieved had Michael McGahey, NUM Scottish Area President and NUM Vice President, 
been NUM President rather than Scargill. Peter Ackers, revisiting discussions about the 
strike in 1984-5 within the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), has made a similar set 
of criticisms. Without a national ballot the federal structure of the union was deployed, so 
that its distinct constituents, such as the NUM Scottish Area, used area procedures to 
declare area strikes. Areas on strike then attempted to ‘persuade’ other areas to join, in the 
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first instance through picketing pits where miners continued working. This led to disorder, 
initially at working mines in Nottinghamshire, but later also at pits in Scotland, and at steel 
mills and other economic pinch points. As a result the NUM was isolated politically, 
inhibiting the construction and mobilisation of broader anti-Conservative government forces 
in defence of miners’ jobs. Ackers adds that retreat should have been attempted by the 
NUM, engaging with the NCB case for closures and accepting some losses. This would have 
postponed coalfield deindustrialisation and the attendant miseries of unemployment, 
poverty and social exclusion (2014). 
 These issues are complex and remain divisive. The NUM rationalised the absence of 
a national ballot in 1984-5 on the basis that the question of coal closures did not affect all 
miners equally, and it would be unfair for securely-employed men to vote less securely-
employed men out of their jobs (Beynon, 1985: 12-13). At Ravenscraig the NUM reached an 
agreement with rail and steel unions to ration coal supply to the British Steel Corporation 
(BSC) works, allowing the furnaces to stay lit but preventing production, as a means of 
exerting political pressure on the government. BSC management broke this embargo by 
organising large-scale road supply of imported coal from its Hunterston terminal on the 
Clyde, which huge NUM pickets in the first week of May were designed to block. In the 
Scottish Parliament Findlay criticised the policing of Ravenscraig (29231), but otherwise this 
important episode and the ballot controversy were only indirectly alluded to. Cunningham 
stated that ‘miners chose their democratic right to strike because of the significant job 
losses that were occurring’ (29235), while Fraser referred to the alleged public ‘disapproval 
of the methods used by the miners’ in 1984, and their ‘irresponsible’ nature (29228). 
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 Criticism of Scargill and the NUM’s negotiating strategy was, however, more 
explicitly examined, first by Fraser (29228), and then by Christine Grahame, SNP MSP for 
Midlothian South, Tweeddale and Lauderdale (29232-4). Fraser said that Scargill’s 
inflexibility in a sequence of inconclusive peace talks with NCB representatives, held at 
different locations between June and September, left the government ‘with little room for 
manoeuvre’. Grahame followed this line of argument, claiming that the NUM President had 
‘walked into a well-planned Tory trap’, with the strike ‘called at the height of summer, when 
coal stocks were at their highest’. This was factually incorrect, in two ways: the strike was 
not ‘called’ by Scargill, but grew organically in Scotland in response to NCB management’s 
anti-union strategy; and it developed over the course of the winter of 1983-4, officially 
commencing in March and not the summer. Grahame also articulated, at length, the 
counter-factual ventured by Eadie in Scottish Affairs: 
 
If Mick McGahey had been given a greater role at the time, perhaps the history of 
the trade union movement and Tory privatisation would have been different. If he 
had led, with his better understanding of the strategy required and the essence of 
right timing, and being more personable, eloquent and persuasive to the public than 
Scargill, I do not think that the humiliation of the miners and the subsequent 
rampage of privatisation would have been so easily won. 
 
This is a popular strand of coalfield memory. David Hamilton, NUM delegate for 
Monktonhall Colliery in 1984 and Labour MP for Midlothian since 2001, told the author in 
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2009 that ‘Mick would have found a mechanism’ for ending the strike ‘honourably’, 
preserving pits and jobs by agreement. When asked to specify what such ‘mechanism’ 
would have been Hamilton humorously and self-deprecatingly contrasted his own alleged 
shortcomings with McGahey’s greater intelligence and cunning: ‘I don’t know, but Mick 
would have found a way through it’. A similar view was articulated by several other strike 
participants in 2009, including Willie Clarke and Iain Chalmers, both of Seafield, and Eric 
Clarke, NUM Scottish Area Secretary (Phillips, 2012: 86). 
 The precise origins of the ‘McGahey as NUM President’ counter-factual are unclear, 
although the workings of the cultural circuit can be discerned. Scargill was persistently 
vilified in the media on ideological as well as personal grounds (Philo, 1989: passim), and in 
retirement continues to attract hostile press coverage (Harris, 2014). As pertinently, 
however, there were also discrete criticisms of Scargill during and immediately after the 
strike from within the NUM. Ackers has detailed these, in his examination of Communist 
Party of Great Britain discussions in 1984-5. Much of this dissent was articulated by NUM 
officials from South Wales and Scotland, including George Bolton, Scottish Area Vice 
President, although McGahey himself never publicly criticised Scargill. This internal 
Communist and NUM murmuring contributed to the growth of the anti-Scargill narrative, 
within the labour movement and in society more broadly. It clearly emboldened Neil 
Kinnock, Labour Party leader, who was close politically and by Parliamentary constituency to 
the NUM in South Wales, to attack Scargill with increasing ferocity in the years following the 
strike (Milne, 2014: 247-53). 
 The question nevertheless remains: what would McGahey have done to settle the 
strike by agreement? The government was, after all, committed to defeating the strike, 
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expending enormous resources to achieve this end. In the summer of 1984 Nigel Lawson, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said that the economic and financial costs of the strike 
were a ‘worthwhile investment’. Including lost production and tax revenues, replacement 
coal stocks and additional oil burn charges, reduced economic activity, and the huge policing 
charges, these costs amounted to around £6 billion, or £14 billion at 2014 prices. This sum 
exceeds the NCB’s pre-strike projected losses across England, Wales and Scotland for the 
financial year of 1984–5, about £105 million, by a factor of sixty to one (Phillips, 2012: 53, 
146). 
What was the government seeking to obtain from this investment? The priority in 
the coal dispute, it must be emphasised, was eliminating trade union voice from the 
industry, particularly in relation to high-order strategic questions like closures (Phillips, 
2014). The government saw this as central to its larger ambition of redistributing economic 
resources and social authority from employees to employers, to liberate business and 
management, and strengthen market forces (Gamble, 1994: passim). This narrowed greatly 
the NUM’s scope for effective action, including a negotiated settlement that left meaningful 
remnants of the industry intact. Ned Smith, NCB industrial relations director, argued in his 
memoirs that such an outcome was prevented by his boss, Ian MacGregor, the NCB 
Chairman, operating under government instruction (127–8). NUM Scottish Area records 
demonstrate that McGahey also believed that the government was instructing MacGregor 
to block a settlement (NUMSA: 15 October 1984). Minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Group 
on Coal (CMGC), recently released under the 30-year rule, show that Smith and McGahey 
were correct. Thatcher told the CMGC in May that the NCB’s ‘negotiating brief’ would have 
to be ‘clearly delineated’, meaning that an agreement must only be secured where the NUM 
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accepted that pits would be closed on economic grounds, and that the NCB would have the 
ultimate authority to effect closures where such grounds existed (CMGC: 30 May 1984). 
Before talks in July she reaffirmed this position: ‘it was important that the terms [of any 
resolution] should be seen to permit the closures sought by the NCB before the strike’ 
(CMGC: 11 July 1984). In advance of negotiations resuming in September she insisted that 
the ‘most important requirement would be an agreement that would not in any way fetter 
the NCB in arranging the closure, as and when necessary, of uneconomic pits’ (CMGC: 12 
September 1984). 
Thatcher was seeking to establish managerial sovereignty in the coal industry, to 
over-ride the joint-regulatory mechanisms and moral economy assumptions that had 
shaped coalfield development, including the carefully-managed process of contraction since 
the 1960s. It is difficult to see how an agreement providing the NCB with unilateral powers 
to determine future closures could have been acceptable to the striking miners. McGahey 
understood this. The July talks, for example, foundered on the NCB’s insistence on the word 
‘beneficially’: pits would be shut down when their reserves could no longer be ‘beneficially 
developed’. McGahey said that ‘beneficially’ had an ‘economic connotation’: ‘if a colliery 
was not beneficial in terms of profits, it was not economically viable’, so the NCB would 
close it. The NUM could not accept this, he stated, ‘rejecting any concept of uneconomic 
closures, this being the basic, fundamental and central question of the whole dispute’ 
(NUMSA: 23 July 1984). The evidence from the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal files 
plainly outweighs the arguments articulated in the Scottish Parliament debate: attempts to 
secure a negotiated settlement were blocked by the government’s disabling opposition 
rather than Scargill’s intransigence; and McGahey could not have supported the removal of 
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union voice from decisions about closures, which was the only form of ‘agreement’ 
allowable by the government. 
The Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal files also qualify the argument that the NUM’s 
targeting of Ravenscraig was misguided. The threatened cessation of production certainly 
troubled steel workers and other potential supporters of the strike, but importantly it also 
placed substantial pressure on the government. This was vital, given the absence of other 
meaningful sources of political traction for the striking miners, with coal stocks at power 
stations in April 1984 promising endurance of electricity supply well into 1985 (CMGC: 12 
April 1984). Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, viewed coal shortages 
at Ravenscraig as the government’s outstanding economic difficulty at the end of April, 
threatening a halt to production that would endanger supply to a range of industrial 
customers (CMGC: 30 April 1984). This pressure was intensified by the NUM’s squeeze on 
road supply in the week that followed, with a combined force of 3,000 pickets at 
Ravenscraig and Hunterston on 7 May. Scottish Office thinking at this point was that 
production at Ravenscraig would cease altogether within three days (Phillips, 2012: 95). 
On 8 May the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal discussed the crisis, examining why 
Scottish chief constables had not replicated the practice followed in England of stopping 
pickets on the open road, preventing them from reaching their targets. Thatcher directed 
George Younger, the Secretary of State for Scotland, to ask this specific question of Scottish 
chief constables, using public order legislation ‘to prevent pickets going to the scene of 
possible disturbances’ (CMGC: 8 May). The effect was immediate. On 10 May officers of 
Strathclyde Police halted 290 miners from West Fife, Clackmannan and Stirlingshire on the 
A80 at Stepps, many miles from Ravenscraig and Hunterston. There were dozens of arrests, 
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with miners held for several hours at different police stations in Glasgow. Thatcher’s highly 
irregular intervention – micro-managing the policing of the strike in Scotland – had a 
decisive bearing on events, as the NUM Scottish Area, confronted by the new situation, 
suspended its opposition to large-scale rail transport of coal to Ravenscraig on 11 May. 
 
Victimisation and Justice 
The police action during the Ravenscraig crisis is an important element in the third area of 
contention examined in the Scottish Parliament on 20 March 2014: the victimisation of 
striking miners and the campaign for restorative justice for those wrongfully arrested during 
the strike, and consequently dismissed from employment by the NCB. This represented a 
major political division between Labour and other parties in Holyrood, including the SNP 
government, and brings the question of social class – raised earlier in the discussion of 
communities – back into focus. Class is politically problematic for all mainstream political 
parties seeking the widest possible electoral mandate, including Labour, and even when 
examining historical events like the 1984-5 strike. Among Labour MSPs, it will be 
remembered, only Neil Findlay framed his comments around the working class nature of the 
strike. But SNP members in 2014 seemed particularly reluctant to think about class as a 
factor in 1984-5, and specifically rejected the argument that the strike was a major site of 
anti-working class injustice. This is partly because they are responsible, as the governing 
party, for devolved matters of policing and justice. It may also reflect the disinclination of 
SNP ministers – reflecting the broader mood in the Scottish Parliament – to accept the 
political salience of social class. 
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 The victimisation of strikers – by police, the courts and the NCB – was a general 
phenomenon across the British coalfields in 1984-5. Press and media coverage in the 2010s 
has focused on South Yorkshire Police, where the seeming organisation of fabricated 
evidence by officers in relation to the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium disaster was 
apparently prefaced by similar malpractice in the miners’ strike. There are strong 
suggestions that senior officers orchestrated the falsification of evidence against dozens of 
NUM members at Orgreave in South Yorkshire, the BSC coke depot and scene of intensive 
picketing and policing in May and June 1984 (Conn, 2012). Findlay claimed in the Scottish 
Parliament that there were analogous problems in the policing of the strike in Scotland 
(29231), contributing to a proportionally higher level of victimisation than in England and 
Wales. Some 206 Scottish miners, 1.5 per cent of the strikers, were sacked, compared with 
about 800 or 0.6 per cent of the strikers in England and Wales (Hutton, 2005: 57). 
Findlay made reference to a number of individual miscarriages of justice in Scotland 
in 1984-5, with each instance pointing to collusion between police officers and the NCB 
(29231-2). Trade union activists and officials were apparently targeted on picket lines and in 
communities, and arrested for alleged public order offences. Cunningham, speaking for the 
Scottish government, acknowledged that individual injustices may have taken place, and 
encouraged ex-miners with complaints to use the Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission or the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (29236-7). Fraser, 
defending the record of the Conservative government, likewise claimed that ex-miners 
should utilise these existing mechanisms to pursue individual grievances (29228). This 
seemed to miss the point that miners were victimised systematically, in order to break their 
collective resolve. Gray articulated this argument, when supporting Findlay’s call for a 
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general investigation of how justice was pursued during the strike: ‘It was a strategic 
approach to policing … which is why the cases warrant a collective review of how those 
miners came to be victimised’ (29236). 
There was indeed a very strong sense in 1984-5 that policing, together with the 
broader criminal justice system, was used as an instrument of discipline against the striking 
miners. On 23 May 1984 George Younger met a delegation of Labour MPs, led by Donald 
Dewar, who were protesting about the mobilisation of the police to break the strike, in 
defence of the narrow aims of government rather than the broader interests of society. 
Younger obfuscated, claiming that the government was not instructing the police on 
picketing, at Ravenscraig or anywhere else in Scotland. Like Cunningham and Fraser in 2014 
he suggested that miners who felt wronged by the police – either when stopped on the 
open road, their freedom of movement curtailed, or when picketing – should pursue the 
matter through the courts. Alex Eadie, MP for Midlothian, an ex-Fife miner, former Labour 
government energy minister and in 1984 chair of the mining group of MPs at Westminster, 
robustly criticised this position from a class perspective. His constituents did not trust in the 
neutrality of the legal system, he said, and in any case could not pursue legal action against 
the police because the costs of doing so were prohibitively high. Eadie also spoke about the 
social costs of the government’s political policing. ‘He could not stress strongly enough’, 
Younger’s officials noted, ‘the damage which was being done to the police relationship with 
the country. If this suffers we all suffer’ (Policing of the Miners’ Dispute, 1984). 
The Labour Party developed this theme after the strike, with a report by Merlyn 
Rees, Shadow Home Secretary, and Gordon Brown, then MP for Dunfermline East, on the 
coalfield tensions between police and public. This report positioned the strike within the 
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wider phenomenon of public disorder shaped by declining industrial employment, rising 
joblessness and the emergent ‘divisive society’. Rees and Brown recommended a Royal 
Commission on the relationship between police authorities, chief constables and 
government, with a view to new legislation, along with a major inquiry – on the lines of the 
Scarman inquiry on the policing of the inner-city riots of 1981 – into the policing of the strike 
itself (Labour Party, 1985). Government materials released in 2014 show that Labour was 
correct to suspect that policing and the operation of the justice system more broadly were 
working against the miners. Ministers in the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal, including 
Michael Ancram, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, made 
reference to pressing the Procurators Fiscal to accelerate cases against miners as a means of 
disciplining and discouraging the generality of strikers (4 September 1984). Subsequent 
penalties for picket-line offences were typically four or five times higher than for other 
public order offences. Once arrested, moreover, men were summarily dismissed by the NCB, 
and refused reinstatement even where charges were subsequently dropped or convictions 
not secured. Hence the course of action proposed by Cunningham and Fraser in 2014, that 
wronged miners seek restitution through the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission or 
the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner, would have limited practical effect. 
Being victimised entailed more than criminal charges and possible conviction. Arrested men, 
to reiterate, whether prosecuted and convicted or not, lost their coal industry jobs, incurred 
substantial financial debts and sometimes experienced personal difficulties as a result, 
including marital and family breakdown. Those made redundant in this manner found it 
even more difficult than other ex-miners to gain alternative work. There is evidence that 
many of the victimised were secretly black-listed by anti-trade union employers because of 
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their strike activism, further distancing the prospect of gainful employment, particularly in 
relatively well-paid manual sectors (Phillips, 2012: 169). 
This pattern of events amplified the scale of class injustice experienced by the 
strikers in Scotland. The apparent collaboration between police and NCB was sharply 
illuminated by a curious incident in Ayrshire in the autumn of 1984, when the first strike-
breaker was brought to Killoch Colliery on a bus from New Cumnock. Police officers on the 
bus brought it to a halt outside the colliery, and invited on board six strikers, who wanted to 
speak to the strike-breaker. The officers then commanded the bus to move off with the 
strikers, into the pit yard. The New Cumnock man did not turn back, but three of the strikers 
were subsequently dismissed by the NCB for trespass (Phillips, 2012: 150). The pattern of 
victimisation was part of the wider anti-union NCB strategy within Scotland which preceded 
the strike, and intensified afterwards. This was ‘class struggle from above’, to use Ralph 
Miliband’s telling phrase (1989: 115-66), as Wheeler and his officials down-graded joint 
industrial regulation, in the context of the Conservative government’s broader attack on the 
moral economy of employment security and trade union influence in the workplace and 
policy-making. The Scottish government was unwilling in 2014 to examine the systematic 
basis of this victimisation of trade unionists, or see that policing and the justice system more 
generally in 1984-5 were used to discipline the working class. This will disappoint the 
victimised ex-miners and their many supporters, but is perhaps consistent with the 
mainstream political silence on the inequalities and injustices of social class in contemporary 
Scotland. 
 
Conclusion 
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The Scottish Parliament’s debate on the 30th anniversary of the miners’ strike illuminated 
the importance of ‘composure’ and the ‘cultural circuit’ in generating individual and public 
memories. MSPs mobilised and reinforced existing strike narratives that were consistent 
with their larger political narratives. Hence the SNP members positioned the strike as an 
external imposition on Scotland, keen as they apparently were to de-emphasise Scotland’s 
internal social fissures. Labour members, constructing narratives of social solidarity within 
coalfield communities, avoided specific reference to the painful and ‘discomposing’ fact of 
strike-breaking. Substantial politicised divisions clearly still exist: on the economics of coal 
and the social costs of pit closures; the strategies of the NUM and the UK Conservative 
government; and, above all perhaps, on the question of restorative justice for victimised 
strikers. This article placed these controversies in the context of historical argument and 
evidence. It showed the importance of the moral economy of the Scottish coalfields. 
Closures in the 1960s and 1970s were acceptable because moral economy criteria were 
satisfied: they were negotiated between representatives of the NCB and industry trade 
unions; and agreed because the economic security of coalfield communities was maintained 
through the provision of widening employment alternatives. Closures in the 1980s violated 
this moral economy: they were settled by managerial fiat, against trade union and 
workforce opposition; and they took place in an environment of deindustrialisation and 
recession, with redundant miners forced into unemployment and communities bereft of 
economic stability. 
Closures in the 1980s were rationalised by arguments about the financial costs of 
producing coal. This article has shown that these costs were exaggerated, while the 
predicted negative social consequences of not producing coal – community destabilisation 
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and embedded poverty – were broadly accurate. The strike was designed to prevent this 
eventuality. NUM strategy in 1984-5 has been criticised, particularly for the absence of a 
national strike ballot and the arguably inflexible negotiating position when attempting to 
reach a settlement with the NCB. But these criticisms are obviated by evidence that the 
Conservative government destabilised the NUM-NCB negotiations in order to eliminate 
trade union voice from decisions about closures. The victimisation of strikers – the arrests, 
convictions, dismissals and covert employment black-listings – were part of the general 
‘class struggle from above’, and central to the Conservative government’s broader anti-
trade union strategy of the 1980s. Victimisation remains a live issue in the 2010s, but calls 
for restorative justice for the wronged men and their families are hampered by the Scottish 
government’s reluctance to countenance social class as a salient political factor. 
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